{"id":1793,"date":"2026-06-24T02:29:44","date_gmt":"2026-06-24T01:29:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/swedishpost.org\/?p=1793"},"modified":"2026-06-24T02:29:44","modified_gmt":"2026-06-24T01:29:44","slug":"eu-defence-chief-says-ukraine-should-be-integrated-into-europe-s-future-defence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/swedishpost.org\/?p=1793","title":{"rendered":"EU Defence Chief Says Ukraine Should Be Integrated Into Europe\u2019s Future Defence Union"},"content":{"rendered":"

BRUSSELS \u2014 EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said Ukraine should be integrated into a future European Defence Union, casting Kyiv not merely as a beneficiary of European military support but as an essential component of the continent\u2019s future security architecture.<\/p>\n

Speaking in Brussels on June 23, Kubilius argued that Europe had a strategic interest in incorporating Ukraine\u2019s military strength and defence-industrial capabilities into a more unified European system. His remarks came during a week in which EU institutions and member states were again focused on defence readiness, industrial scale-up and the long-term security guarantees that would be required for Ukraine in any durable settlement of Russia\u2019s war.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt would be difficult to understand if we in Europe would not take it as our vital interest to integrate the military force of Ukraine into our European defence architecture,\u201d Kubilius said, according to Reuters. He also said Ukraine was \u201cprevailing\u201d because of the transformation of its war doctrine, pointing to the country\u2019s rapid adaptation under the pressure of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion.<\/p>\n

The statement marks a significant articulation of a policy direction that has been gaining ground in Brussels: that Ukraine\u2019s integration into Europe\u2019s defence structures should not wait for the completion of wider EU or NATO membership processes. Kubilius has repeatedly argued that Europe\u2019s future defence arrangements should be built around practical capabilities, industrial capacity and battlefield lessons, with Ukraine treated as a partner whose experience is directly relevant to the security of the entire continent.<\/p>\n

The immediate context is the EU\u2019s push to increase defence readiness by 2030. European leaders have endorsed a sharper focus on capability gaps, industrial production, common procurement, air defence, drones, counter-drone systems, deep precision strike capabilities, military mobility and space-based security assets. The European Council\u2019s latest conclusions on Ukraine and European defence stated that Russia\u2019s war remains an existential challenge for the EU and that Europe\u2019s defence readiness must be \u201cdecisively ramped up\u201d by 2030.<\/p>\n

Kubilius\u2019s intervention places Ukraine at the centre of that ramp-up. Ukraine has developed large-scale operational experience in drone warfare, electronic warfare, decentralised battlefield innovation, rapid procurement adaptation and integration between frontline units and domestic manufacturers. For Brussels, those lessons increasingly carry relevance beyond the Ukrainian battlefield, particularly as EU member states seek to modernise forces that were often designed for peacetime procurement cycles rather than high-intensity conflict.<\/p>\n

The European Commission has already taken steps to formalise closer industrial links with Ukraine. In May, the Commission launched the EU-Ukraine Drone Alliance, an industry-led initiative intended to connect manufacturers, innovators, start-ups, scale-ups and end-users from the EU, EEA-EFTA states and Ukraine. The initiative is designed to support European drone and counter-drone capability by drawing on lessons learned from Ukraine\u2019s wartime innovation ecosystem.<\/p>\n

That approach fits Kubilius\u2019s broader argument that Ukraine\u2019s defence sector should be integrated into the European defence industry, the European defence market and, ultimately, a future European Defence Union. In policy terms, the three elements are distinct but mutually reinforcing. Industrial integration would involve production partnerships, joint development, licensing, supply-chain access and investment. Market integration would seek to reduce barriers between Ukrainian and EU defence firms. A future defence union would imply a more structured political and security framework, though its institutional shape remains undefined.<\/p>\n

The term \u201cEuropean Defence Union\u201d has acquired renewed prominence as EU officials debate how far the bloc can go in defence without duplicating NATO or undermining national sovereignty. Defence remains a sensitive competence in the EU system, with member states retaining core authority over armed forces, procurement choices, exports and national security policy. The European Council has repeatedly stressed that a stronger EU role in security and defence should complement NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for those EU states that are alliance members.<\/p>\n

\"EU<\/figure>\n

Kubilius\u2019s remarks therefore do not amount to an immediate institutional decision. They are, however, an important signal from the commissioner responsible for defence and space that Ukraine should be part of the architecture Europe is now trying to construct. The message is particularly relevant because the EU is moving from a period dominated by emergency support measures toward longer-term planning around deterrence, production capacity and readiness.<\/p>\n

For Ukraine, the political significance is clear. Kyiv has long argued that its security cannot be separated from Europe\u2019s security and that its armed forces are already defending the continent\u2019s eastern flank. Ukrainian officials have also sought deeper integration into EU procurement, defence innovation and military support mechanisms, while continuing to pursue full EU membership. Kubilius\u2019s position aligns with the Ukrainian view that defence integration should be treated as a practical security necessity rather than as a symbolic gesture.<\/p>\n

The European Council\u2019s June conclusions reinforced that direction, stating that further enhancing EU-Ukraine defence industrial cooperation remains crucial. Leaders also called for accelerated production and delivery of priority equipment to Ukraine, including air defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles, and urged further efforts to strengthen Europe\u2019s defence technological and industrial base so it can deliver equipment at the necessary speed and scale.<\/p>\n

The defence-industrial dimension is central to the debate. Russia\u2019s war has exposed the limits of European ammunition stocks, production capacity and fragmented procurement. EU countries have increased defence budgets, but spending more does not automatically translate into common capability. The Commission and several member states argue that Europe must spend faster, spend together and reduce duplication across national systems. Kubilius\u2019s call implies that Ukraine should not be treated as an external customer of that process but as a participating defence-industrial actor.<\/p>\n

That could have practical consequences for procurement policy. The EU\u2019s SAFE instrument, adopted in 2025, is designed to provide up to \u20ac150 billion in loans to member states for defence investments, with a focus on urgent and large-scale procurement. The programme allows projects to involve Ukraine and EEA-EFTA countries alongside EU member states, reflecting the Commission\u2019s view that European defence readiness can be strengthened through broader cooperation with closely aligned partners.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s inclusion in defence projects also addresses a capability problem. Ukrainian forces have accumulated direct experience against Russian tactics, missiles, drones, electronic warfare systems and layered attacks on energy and civilian infrastructure. EU militaries, by contrast, have often relied on planning assumptions that did not fully anticipate the scale and speed of attrition seen in Ukraine. Integrating Ukrainian expertise could therefore help shape future European requirements for air defence, counter-drone systems, ammunition production, mobility, battlefield software and resilient command structures.<\/p>\n

The political challenge is that a future European Defence Union would need agreement among governments with different threat perceptions, defence traditions and constitutional constraints. Eastern and Nordic states generally place Russia at the centre of their security planning, while some southern and western member states have broader geographic priorities, including the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Neutral or militarily non-aligned traditions in some countries also affect the pace and form of integration.<\/p>\n

Export controls and industrial competition add another layer of complexity. Defence companies operate within national licensing regimes, and governments remain cautious about technology transfer, supply-chain exposure and market access. Bringing Ukrainian companies more deeply into European structures would require rules on eligibility, financing, intellectual property, security clearance, production standards and wartime risk. These are technical issues, but they will shape whether political statements can become operational policy.<\/p>\n

There is also the question of how a European Defence Union would relate to Ukraine\u2019s EU accession process. Ukraine is pursuing full EU membership, and EU leaders have recently reaffirmed support for its accession path. Kubilius has framed defence integration as complementary to, not a substitute for, eventual EU membership. That distinction matters because Kyiv has rejected arrangements that appear to offer second-tier status in place of full integration with European institutions.<\/p>\n

\"EU<\/figure>\n

The broader security setting remains highly unstable. EU leaders have condemned Russia\u2019s continued missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, as well as incidents affecting EU member states, including violations of airspace and drone-related security threats. The European Council has said Ukraine\u2019s long-term ability to defend itself must be guaranteed and that Europe should be prepared to contribute to robust and credible security guarantees in coordination with partners.<\/p>\n

Kubilius\u2019s argument reflects a shift in European language from short-term support to structural adaptation. Earlier phases of the war focused on emergency deliveries, sanctions, macro-financial assistance and keeping Ukraine\u2019s state functions operating. The current debate is increasingly about whether Europe can organise itself for a prolonged confrontation with Russia, whether it can sustain industrial production at scale, and whether it can embed Ukraine\u2019s military capabilities into a wider deterrence posture.<\/p>\n

The commissioner\u2019s remarks also land amid continuing discussions about the future of transatlantic security. European officials have repeatedly said that a stronger European defence role should reinforce NATO rather than replace it. At the same time, uncertainty over long-term U.S. commitments has intensified arguments that Europe must be able to assume more responsibility for its own security. For Kubilius, Ukraine\u2019s military experience appears to be one of the assets Europe should use in building that capacity.<\/p>\n

In institutional terms, the EU still lacks a single army, a fully integrated defence market or a unified command structure for territorial defence. Its defence policy relies on a mixture of national forces, EU funding tools, the European Defence Agency, Commission industrial programmes, intergovernmental arrangements and NATO structures. A European Defence Union would require decisions on governance, financing, procurement, operational planning and participation by non-EU partners such as Ukraine, the United Kingdom or Norway.<\/p>\n

For now, Kubilius\u2019s statement is best understood as a policy marker. It does not create a new legal structure, but it sets a direction for the debate inside EU institutions: Ukraine\u2019s role in European defence should be considered permanent, strategic and institutional, rather than temporary and transactional. The argument is that Ukraine\u2019s armed forces and defence industry have become part of Europe\u2019s security reality through war, and that European policy must adapt accordingly.<\/p>\n

The next tests will be legislative and budgetary. EU institutions are working on defence-related initiatives covering procurement, industrial reinforcement, military mobility and innovation. Member states will have to decide how far they are willing to pool demand, coordinate production and open defence supply chains. Ukraine\u2019s participation in those mechanisms will depend on political agreement, legal design and the ability to reconcile wartime urgency with EU rules.<\/p>\n

Kubilius\u2019s remarks also increase pressure on European governments to define what they mean by security guarantees for Ukraine. If Ukraine is to be part of Europe\u2019s future defence architecture, the relationship would likely involve more than arms deliveries. It could include long-term procurement contracts, training, joint production, integrated air defence planning, technology partnerships, intelligence-related cooperation and structured involvement in capability coalitions.<\/p>\n

For Kyiv, that would strengthen the case that Ukraine\u2019s defence is not a peripheral issue but a core European security function. For the EU, it would test whether the bloc can translate strategic language into durable institutions. The central question after Kubilius\u2019s speech is no longer only how much Europe should send to Ukraine, but how deeply Ukraine should be built into the system Europe is designing for its own defence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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