France and Germany have moved towards a common position in favour of tougher European Union trade defences against China, potentially removing one of the main political obstacles to faster action by Brussels. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz used a joint ministerial meeting near Cologne to call for stronger safeguards against rapidly increasing Chinese exports and a widening trade imbalance that they said was placing European manufacturing under severe pressure.
The declarations represent more than another warning about Chinese industrial competition. France has consistently advocated a more interventionist European trade policy, including tariffs, European purchasing preferences and measures intended to counter foreign subsidies. Germany, by contrast, has historically defended open markets and cautioned against steps that could trigger retaliation against its export-oriented manufacturers. The emerging convergence between Paris and Berlin therefore changes the political balance inside the EU.
Macron said the two countries had “never been as aligned” on China and called for emergency measures capable of protecting European companies before import shocks caused permanent industrial losses. He also advocated early-warning procedures that would give the European Commission better information about sudden changes in import volumes, pricing or market share and allow it to respond more rapidly.
Merz supported the French assessment and pointed to what he described as an EU trade deficit with China of about $1 billion a day. He said the present trajectory was damaging Europe and could not continue indefinitely. At the same time, the chancellor called for frank dialogue with Beijing, indicating that Germany still favours a negotiated rebalancing where possible rather than an immediate escalation into a general trade confrontation.
The leaders said French and German finance ministers would prepare proposals for safeguard measures to be presented in September. The precise legal structure has not yet been announced. The initiative could involve new instruments, changes to existing EU trade-defence procedures or political guidance allowing the Commission to use current powers more quickly and across a wider range of industries.
Safeguards differ from conventional anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties. Those measures usually require an investigation showing that imports were unfairly priced or supported by distortive state assistance and that European producers suffered material injury. A safeguard mechanism can instead address a sudden and damaging increase in imports, although its use must still comply with EU law and World Trade Organization obligations.
Paris has argued that the EU’s existing procedures are too slow for sectors in which Chinese producers can expand production, reduce prices and gain market share within months. By the time a detailed investigation is completed and duties are approved, European factories may already have reduced capacity, dismissed workers or abandoned investment projects. France therefore wants the Commission to identify threats earlier and intervene before market disruption becomes irreversible.
Germany’s willingness to support that argument reflects intensifying pressure on its own industrial model. For decades, German companies benefited from selling vehicles, chemicals and industrial machinery to China while using Chinese suppliers and production sites. That relationship has changed as Chinese manufacturers have become increasingly competitive in advanced sectors that were once dominated by European companies.
German carmakers are particularly exposed. Chinese producers have gained ground in electric vehicles, batteries, digital vehicle systems and plug-in hybrids, while demand for some German brands has weakened both inside China and in other international markets. Volkswagen and other manufacturers have announced or considered major restructuring programmes as they confront high European production costs, slower domestic growth and stronger Asian competition.
The political impact extends beyond individual corporate decisions. Manufacturing supports large employment networks across Germany, including component suppliers, engineering companies, logistics operators and specialised small and medium-sized businesses. Industrial weakness has therefore become a central economic and electoral concern, increasing pressure on Berlin to reconsider its earlier reluctance to use European trade barriers.
Germany opposed or criticised some previous French proposals because officials feared that broad restrictions would raise costs, weaken export relationships and provoke Beijing. Under former chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany opposed the EU’s decision to impose additional duties on Chinese-made electric vehicles. Merz’s support for stronger safeguards suggests that Berlin now views insufficient protection as a greater risk than it did two years ago.
France enters the debate from a different economic and political tradition. Successive French governments have called for European strategic autonomy, stronger industrial policy and a preference for European production in sensitive sectors. Paris argues that the EU cannot maintain open access to its single market when foreign competitors benefit from subsidies, cheaper financing, lower regulatory costs or restricted home markets.
Macron has nevertheless stopped short of advocating a complete rupture with China. France continues to seek Chinese investment, export opportunities and cooperation in areas including aviation, energy and climate policy. Its position is that commercial engagement should be conditional on greater reciprocity, more local European production and stronger protection against market distortions.
The same distinction was emphasised at the Franco-German meeting. Both leaders said their objective was not decoupling, a term commonly used for broad economic separation. Instead, they presented the proposed measures as a way to preserve a functioning trading relationship by preventing the loss of Europe’s industrial capacity and strengthening the EU’s leverage in negotiations with Beijing.
The urgency has increased following a sharp rise in Chinese exports during the first half of 2026. Chinese customs figures showed that the country’s total exports grew strongly in June, while monthly vehicle exports exceeded one million units for the first time. Exports to the EU also rose year on year, adding to an already large Chinese surplus in goods trade with the bloc.
Vehicles are only one part of the dispute. European policymakers have identified pressure in steel, chemicals, machinery, solar technology, batteries, electronics and lower-value consumer products. In several industries, Chinese manufacturers combine large-scale production with extensive domestic supply networks, allowing them to offer prices that European competitors struggle to match.
EU officials have also linked China’s export momentum to weak domestic demand and industrial overcapacity. Their concern is that when Chinese consumption and investment fail to absorb factory output, producers redirect larger volumes towards international markets. European companies then face competition from goods priced according to conditions shaped by state support, excess capacity or lower capital costs.
China rejects the characterisation of its industrial success as primarily the result of unfair practices. Beijing has repeatedly argued that its companies are competitive because of technological development, efficient supply chains and sustained investment. Chinese officials have also accused the EU of using protectionist arguments to limit products that European consumers want at affordable prices.
The currency issue adds another layer of sensitivity. Macron and Merz referred to the renminbi as deeply undervalued, arguing that the exchange rate strengthens the price advantage of Chinese exports. Measures based explicitly on currency valuation would be politically contentious and technically difficult, however, because exchange rates reflect multiple economic and financial factors and are normally addressed through broader international consultations.
The EU has already adopted several measures intended to reduce pressure from Chinese imports. It introduced additional duties on battery-electric vehicles manufactured in China after an anti-subsidy investigation and has used anti-dumping or anti-subsidy actions in products including steel and biodiesel. New steel protections and charges on low-value parcels entered into effect in July as Brussels sought to respond to both industrial overcapacity and the rapid expansion of e-commerce shipments.
Those measures have remained largely sector-specific. France and Germany now appear to favour a system capable of responding across industries and at an earlier stage. One possibility would be a mechanism allowing temporary tariffs or quotas when imports rise beyond predetermined thresholds. Another would be an enhanced surveillance framework linked to accelerated Commission investigations.
Any new instrument would require careful legal design. Measures directed explicitly at one country could be challenged at the World Trade Organization unless supported by evidence and compatible with applicable trade rules. Global safeguards, meanwhile, can unintentionally affect friendly trading partners that are not responsible for the underlying disruption. EU officials would therefore need to make the mechanism rapid enough to be useful but sufficiently targeted to avoid unnecessary collateral effects.
The Commission already possesses a substantial trade-defence toolkit. It can impose anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties, restrict access to public procurement, examine foreign subsidies affecting acquisitions and contracts, and deploy the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument when a third country attempts to force a policy change through economic pressure. The Franco-German initiative is based on the view that these powers do not yet provide an adequate response to ordinary but exceptionally fast import surges.
The Anti-Coercion Instrument is not necessarily suited to the problem identified by Macron and Merz. It was designed to address deliberate economic pressure intended to influence political decisions, rather than the broader effects of industrial overcapacity or price competition. Paris and Berlin are therefore likely to focus on instruments that can operate without proving a specific act of political coercion.
The Commission will also have to consider how defensive measures interact with the EU’s industrial strategy. Tariffs or quotas can provide temporary relief, but they do not directly solve high energy prices, fragmented capital markets, investment shortages or regulatory delays inside Europe. German officials are likely to insist that stronger trade defences be combined with reforms intended to make European manufacturers more productive and competitive.
France is expected to support that approach while pressing for European-content requirements in strategic procurement and public investment. Paris argues that EU subsidies and government contracts should not finance supply chains that remain overwhelmingly dependent on China. Germany has historically been more cautious about broad “Buy European” rules but has become increasingly receptive to targeted preferences in areas connected to economic security.
The Franco-German position could gain support from countries including Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium, which have backed proposals for more responsive EU trade tools. Italy has also called for stronger protection of European industry, although governments differ over the sectors that should receive priority and the extent to which procurement or subsidies should favour companies producing within the EU.
Other member states remain cautious. Countries with strong commercial ties to China, important ports or large retail sectors may worry about higher import prices and reduced trade flows. Exporters of luxury goods, agricultural products and industrial equipment are also aware that Beijing can respond with investigations, tariffs, licensing delays or informal restrictions.
China has previously opened investigations into European brandy, pork and dairy products after the EU acted against Chinese electric vehicles. Such measures have exposed political differences within Europe because the costs of retaliation are not distributed evenly. France may accept stronger action to defend manufacturing while facing pressure from cognac producers, while Germany must weigh industrial protection against the interests of companies that still earn substantial revenue in China.
Critical raw materials create an additional vulnerability. China occupies a dominant position in the mining, processing or refining of several materials used in vehicles, electronics, renewable-energy equipment and defence technology. Restrictions or delays involving rare earths and specialised components could disrupt European factories more quickly than conventional tariffs on finished goods.
The Commission has consequently been developing contingency plans and seeking alternative suppliers. Diversification, recycling, strategic stockpiles and domestic processing are increasingly treated as essential components of trade policy. Stronger import safeguards without parallel work on supply security could leave European companies protected in their home market but unable to obtain the components needed to manufacture their products.
Consumer interests will also be part of the debate. Low-priced Chinese vehicles, electronics and household products can reduce costs and accelerate access to new technologies. Tariffs or quotas may preserve employment and investment in Europe but can also increase prices or limit choice. EU governments will have to demonstrate that any intervention is proportionate and directed at specific economic distortions rather than competition itself.
The September proposals are expected to become an early test of whether the political declarations from Cologne can be converted into a common European programme. France and Germany often determine the direction of major EU initiatives, but agreement between them does not guarantee approval by the other 25 member states or immediate action by the Commission.
Important questions remain unresolved, including which products would be covered, what data would trigger intervention, whether restrictions would be temporary and how affected European industries would be required to restructure during any period of protection. Policymakers must also decide whether the mechanism should be formally country-neutral even if its immediate purpose is to address imports from China.
Beijing had not announced a detailed response to the latest Franco-German statements at the time of publication. Chinese authorities are likely to scrutinise the September proposals closely and could seek to prevent other EU governments from joining the initiative. China has historically combined engagement with individual member states and warnings against collective European restrictions.
For the EU, the central challenge is to avoid choosing between unrestricted exposure and indiscriminate protectionism. Macron and Merz are attempting to establish a middle position: maintaining commercial relations with China while giving Brussels the ability to intervene faster when import growth threatens strategically important production.
The durability of the alignment will depend on whether France and Germany continue to agree once concrete sectors, tariffs and economic costs are identified. Their joint declaration has nevertheless established a clearer political direction. Europe’s two largest economies now say the existing trade relationship with China is unsustainable without stronger safeguards, placing the Commission under increased pressure to produce a more forceful EU strategy before the end of 2026.
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