BERLIN — Bavarian premier and Christian Social Union chairman Markus Söder has moved to shut down speculation that his party could participate in an attempt to remove Chancellor Friedrich Merz, offering the embattled German leader a significant public show of support while simultaneously demanding faster and more effective action from the federal government.
Speaking in an interview reported over the weekend, Söder was asked directly whether there could be an effort to topple Merz. His answer concerning his own party was categorical: such a move would come from the CSU “under no circumstances.” Asked whether he could make the same commitment on behalf of Merz’s Christian Democratic Union, Söder drew a clear institutional boundary, saying he was not the CDU chairman and therefore could speak only for the Bavarian sister party.
The distinction was politically notable but did not amount to a withdrawal of support for Merz. Söder also answered affirmatively when asked whether the chancellor remained the right person to lead a government expected to implement difficult reforms. He said Merz continued to stand behind the reform agenda and urged the broader conservative alliance to remain united rather than allowing the Alternative for Germany, or AfD, to drive deeper divisions between the CDU and CSU.
Söder acknowledged that the Union was going through an exceptionally difficult period. He described the current situation as a severe downturn for the conservative bloc but said that was not a reason to abandon the government or its leadership. His intervention is particularly important because the CSU has historically exercised influence over leadership debates across the CDU/CSU alliance, even though it contests elections only in Bavaria.
The immediate backdrop is the CDU’s sharp defeat in Sachsen-Anhalt’s September 6 state election. According to the official preliminary statewide result, the AfD received 43.8% of second votes, an increase of 23 percentage points from 2021. The CDU finished far behind on 17.2%, a fall of 19.9 percentage points. The AfD therefore emerged as the largest party by a wide margin, although it did not secure an outright majority.
The magnitude of the CDU’s losses quickly intensified debate over Merz’s political direction and leadership. The chancellor has faced criticism not only over the party’s electoral performance but also over the government’s ability to translate its reform promises into visible results. The defeat has consequently become a national political test rather than a purely regional setback, increasing scrutiny of the government’s economic, social and migration policies.
Söder’s response seeks to separate criticism of government performance from a leadership revolt. He made clear that he believes the federal coalition needs substantial improvement, but he argued that replacing Merz would not automatically resolve the structural problems confronting the government. In particular, he pointed to continuing disagreements with the Social Democratic Party, the CDU/CSU’s coalition partner, over the pace and scope of reforms.
According to Söder’s argument, any immediate successor to Merz would inherit essentially the same parliamentary arithmetic, coalition constraints and policy disputes. A new chancellor would still have to negotiate with an SPD that, in Söder’s view, has been reluctant to move quickly enough on reforms. That assessment allowed the CSU leader to defend Merz personally while directing a significant share of his criticism toward the coalition’s overall operation.
Söder also resisted the idea that the CDU/CSU should respond to the AfD’s electoral gains by turning inward and launching another leadership struggle. He said the Union should remain together and avoid being pulled apart by the AfD. The message reflects a broader strategic concern inside Germany’s established parties: internal conflict following electoral defeats can further weaken governing parties at precisely the moment their opponents are seeking to portray them as ineffective or exhausted.
His comments therefore serve two purposes. First, they provide Merz with explicit protection from the CSU, removing one potential centre of organised resistance within the conservative camp. Second, they raise the political cost for CDU figures contemplating a leadership challenge because any such effort, under the position publicly stated by Söder, could not be presented as a coordinated initiative of the entire Union bloc.
The CSU chairman nevertheless stopped short of guaranteeing that the current government would remain in office until the scheduled 2029 federal election. Asked whether the CDU/CSU-SPD administration would survive for its full term, Söder said he hoped it would. The formulation reflected the uncertain political environment without endorsing speculation about an imminent collapse.

He also rejected suggestions that Merz was likely simply to give up. When discussion turned to scenarios in which the chancellor might resign or face a failed confidence vote, Söder said surrender was not in Merz’s nature. The comment reinforced his broader argument that the immediate priority should be improving the government’s performance rather than organising a succession contest.
Söder’s own history makes his intervention especially closely watched. The Bavarian leader has previously been considered a potential candidate for the chancellorship and has repeatedly occupied a central position in discussions about the future leadership of Germany’s conservative parties. Earlier in 2026, however, he publicly said that the prospect of another chancellor candidacy was a closed chapter and that the question would not arise again.
Even so, speculation about alternative conservative leaders has resurfaced as Merz has come under pressure. Söder and North Rhine-Westphalia premier Hendrik Wüst have both appeared in German political discussion surrounding possible future leadership scenarios. Söder’s latest comments are therefore more consequential than a routine declaration of party discipline: they amount to a prominent potential rival explicitly distancing himself from an immediate challenge.
At the same time, Söder used the interview to press for changes in substance. He argued that the government needed to accelerate its work significantly and described its achievements so far as insufficient. Among the issues he said required stronger action were misuse of social benefits, the effects of fiscal drag on taxpayers and high energy costs — themes that connect the electoral debate directly to household finances and Germany’s economic competitiveness.
He also directed criticism toward SPD Labour Minister Bärbel Bas, calling for faster implementation of measures intended to tackle abuse of social benefits. Bas has said an action plan is expected before the end of the year. Söder’s criticism illustrates the increasingly difficult balance inside the governing coalition: CDU and CSU leaders want to demonstrate that they have understood voters’ dissatisfaction, while the SPD is defending its own priorities on welfare, labour and social policy.
The pressure is unlikely to ease immediately. Germany faces another significant electoral test on September 20, when voters in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern elect a new state parliament and Berlin chooses a new House of Representatives. The Federal Returning Officer lists both elections for that date, one week after the September 13 municipal elections in Lower Saxony.
For Merz, the upcoming votes matter well beyond their regional consequences. Another weak CDU performance could intensify demands for changes in strategy, communication or personnel. Conversely, results that stabilise the conservative vote would give the chancellor greater room to argue that Sachsen-Anhalt represented an especially severe regional setback rather than proof of an irreversible national decline.
The Mecklenburg-Vorpommern contest is particularly closely watched because it comes only two weeks after Sachsen-Anhalt and is taking place amid significant pressure on several established parties. The state parliament has confirmed September 20 as election day, with voters choosing at least 71 lawmakers for the next five-year legislative term. Berlin’s election on the same day further increases the national significance of the weekend.
Söder’s intervention can therefore be read as an attempt to impose a temporary truce on leadership speculation before those votes. By ruling out a CSU-led challenge, he has reduced uncertainty within one half of the conservative alliance while leaving the CDU responsible for its own internal debate. His carefully drawn distinction — strong support from the CSU without pretending to control the CDU — allows him to defend the chancellor without denying that dissatisfaction exists.
That approach also protects Söder politically. Openly undermining Merz before further elections could expose the CSU to accusations that it was worsening the Union’s instability for internal advantage. By contrast, supporting the chancellor while demanding tougher government action gives Söder room to argue that he prioritised conservative unity while still warning Berlin that current results were inadequate.

For the SPD, the comments add to pressure from its coalition partner. Söder’s contention that even a replacement chancellor would confront the same reform difficulties effectively frames coalition disputes, rather than Merz alone, as a central source of the government’s problems. That interpretation will remain contested between the governing parties, which differ over spending priorities, welfare policy and the pace of structural economic changes.
The stakes are amplified by Germany’s weak growth environment and public anxiety over living costs, competitiveness, migration and the sustainability of the welfare state. These issues overlap with the areas in which the government has promised reforms, making implementation and communication increasingly central to the coalition’s political survival.
Söder indicated that better communication would also be necessary. While defending Merz against what he characterised as an unusually aggressive campaign, he acknowledged that the chancellor and government could improve both their work and the way they explain it. The combination of defence and criticism reflects the wider Union strategy emerging after Sachsen-Anhalt: avoid a destabilising leadership confrontation while insisting that the government cannot continue unchanged.
That distinction may become harder to maintain if further electoral defeats follow. German chancellors depend not only on constitutional parliamentary majorities but also on the confidence of their parties and coalition partners. Persistent poor election results can erode political authority even when there is no immediate formal mechanism for removing a head of government.
Under Germany’s constitutional system, a sitting chancellor cannot simply be dismissed by a negative parliamentary majority. The Bundestag uses a constructive vote of no confidence, meaning lawmakers seeking to remove a chancellor must simultaneously elect a successor. That requirement is designed to protect governmental stability and makes an organised leadership change more complicated than internal party pressure alone.
Söder’s declaration therefore concerns the political rather than immediate constitutional dimension of Merz’s position. By ruling out CSU participation in a move against him, Söder is signalling that one of the key parties sustaining the chancellorship is not preparing to trigger a succession process. Whether comparable assurances emerge from all influential sections of the CDU remains a separate question.
For now, Söder’s position is that changing the chancellor would treat the symptom rather than the cause. His argument is that the coalition needs faster reforms, stronger execution and clearer communication, and that a replacement leader would confront the same disagreements unless those underlying political problems were resolved.
The statement provides Merz with breathing space but not a blank cheque. Söder has closed the door on a CSU-driven attempt to remove the chancellor while simultaneously setting a demanding standard for what must happen next. The government, in his assessment, needs to accelerate policy delivery, address economic and social concerns more convincingly and recover political momentum before dissatisfaction hardens further.
The next measure of whether that strategy is working will arrive quickly. With Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern voting on September 20, the Union has only a short interval in which to demonstrate unity after its Sachsen-Anhalt defeat. Söder has made clear that, from the CSU’s side, that response will not begin with removing Friedrich Merz. It will begin with demanding that his government perform better.
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